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# This paper contributes to the "network" and "reflective 
equilibrium" approach to social choice in considering three related and 
important allocative criteria,their relations to other criteria, and a 
number of applications. In adequate allocations, each individual's lot 
would not be better attributed to any other individual. In equitable 
allocations, it is not better that any individual receive the lot of 
any other rather than his own.Finally, fundamental dominance results 
from unanimity plus impartiality (non-discrimination). These criteria 
have different deep meanings and differents scopes of applicability and 
of existence. Yet, they are linked by specific strong relations. The 
set of these criteria is thus more meaningful and of wider relevance 
than if each one were considered by itself. These properties also have 
essential relations with market equilibria or stability (cores) in many 
important situations. A number of applications are discussed,
concerning the ethic of distribution and of freedom, assignment 
allocations, the theory of matching markets and in particular of 























































































































































































Social choice has often focussed on "consistency rationality", 
i.e., the existence of a social ordering, while it is more basic that 
it systematically abides by "cognitive rationality", i.e., consistent 
and optimal use of all relevant information (about both facts and 
ethics). Rational social choice — like rationality in any complex 
decision problem—  thus results from what John Rawls aptly calls 
"considered judgement in reflective equilibrium". This implies several 
things: (1) Use of principles or criteria, which are more or less 
general (be they "scientific laws" or moral rules or principles or 
"maxims", in particular application of the "generalization principle" 
of meta-ethics, or even "rules of thumb", norms or traditions). 
(2) For each principle, evaluative consideration back and forth 
between its general formulation and its applied consequences until 
"equilibrium" is reached (this is Rawls’use of the expression, for 
determining principles of social ethics). (3) For each principle, 
evaluative consideration of all its aspects, meanings, requirements, 
implications and applications, domains of meaningfulness, of relevance, 
of acceptability, of decisiveness. (4) Use of several criteria: this 
is what characterizes a "complex" choice situation. (5) Analysis of 
the relations between the criteria, in particular the logical 
relations: is their set inconsistent (as with Arrow's five social 
choice criteria), or on the contrary do they surprisingly imply each 
other, are they unexpectedly equivalent, so that their different 
formulations enrich their meaningfulness (as the comparisons of 
inequalities in Kolm, 1966,1976,1977); are they complementary in 
specifying the choice; or does one imply the other so that the former 
is a specification of the latter and the latter can be taken as an 
extension of an interesting former one beyond its domain of 
applicability0 5 ? This summarizes (correctly, I think) the general 
present state of thinking on the rational method of social choice, so­
cial ethics or "justice", a method which has been called, with various 
emphases, network (of critera) analysis (Edel), the multi-principle 
approach (Leventhal, Mikula, Schwinger), the coherence theory (Brandt), 
reflective equilibrium (Rawls), the "analvtico-dialectical" conception 
(Weinberger), the method of "prima facie obligations" (Ross), "moral 




























































































endorsed by modern "ethicists" such as C.F. Delaney, Stuart Hampshire, 
Norman Daniels, Jane English, Kai Nielsen among others. The great 
Isaiah Berlin speaks of "social morality... as a system of coherent, 
i.e., not internally contradictory (and, according to some moralists, 
mutually entailing) sets of rules" and goes as far as commenting "A 
part of what we mean by rationality is the art of applying, and 
combining, reconciling, choosing among general principles in a manner 
for which complete theoretical explanation (or justification) can 
never, in principle, be given,,(2> . Rational social choice is important 
both because it feeds one's reflexion about how things should be, and 
for explaining how things are since it influences individual and 
collective (social, institutional, political) behavior.
This paper contributes to this consistent or network approach 
for the allocation of resources. It considers a partial, integrated 
network of criteria consisting of a core of three different, but 
closely related, important criteria, "adequacy", "equity" and 
"fundamental dominance", and of other more or less classical or 
specific ones such as freedom of choice and of exchange, unanimity and 
Pareto-efficiency, "fundamental efficiency", non-discrimination and 
impartiality, equality of opportunity, the social welfare function, 
wealth or income or surplus or output maximization or cost 
minimization, stability of exchanges or matchings, non-jealousy and 
non-envy, "Tinbergen-equitable wages", "full-payment equity", "monotone 
sharing", etc. We will consider the meanings and relevance of these 
interfering or related criteria, their properties of possibility, 
existence and uniqueness, and their relations of inclusion or 
implication and specification or extension.
We consider assignments of "lots" to "individuals". In the 
various applications, these terms can have many meanings. For instance 
"individuals" can be physical individuals or other agents or groups or 
institutions (firms, branches, bureaux, families, nations, etc.), and 
"lots" can be consumption of goods or services, properties, locations, 
jobs, job-wage pairs, mates, etc. Roughly speaking (precision will come 
below), the three basic properties and their relations are as follows.




























































































be somebody else's lot. The allocation is equitable if it is not better 
that any individual receive the lot of any other rather than his own. 
For adequacy to be meaningful we only need any criterion for judging to 
whom a lot is better attributed, and such a criterion is implied and 
required by any general allocative judgement. As for this "equity", it 
has a meaning which is by now classical when the defining judgement is 
according to the individual's preference (no one prefers any other's 
lot to his own* 3’ ).
«s a •
An allocation can be adequate and unequitable, or equitable but 
inadequate, as the examples of section 2 will show. It can also be both 
adequate and equitable. But how should we assign given lots to given 
individuals if one assignment is adequate (and unequitable) and another 
one is equitable (and inadequate)? We shall see that such a dilemma 
cannot arise: adequacy and equity are different but necessarily 
non-competing criteria. One example of application, discussed in 
section 11 below, is a solution of the "paradox of marriage" (or of any 
other matching problem). Among stable sets of marriages, there is one 
in which each man marries the woman he prefers among those he can have, 
and also one in which each woman marries the man she prefers among 
those she can have; but when each man marries the woman he prefers in 
this set, then each woman's husband is the man she dislikes the most 
among possible choices, and symmetrically for men in the case of 
women's best choice*4}. But on the other hand the mentioned 
adequacy-equity result implies that in an important case, when each 
woman marries the man she prefers, each man ipso facto receives his 
most preferred mate, and reciprocally. The only solution to this 
apparent contradiction is that, in this case, there is only one stable 
set of marriages* 3 J .
Fundamental dominance results from two more basic properties. 
One is unanimity or its equivalent for the considered comparisons of 
lots for each individual* 6 ) . The other one is "independent impartiality 
(or anonymity)". It means that in each state of affairs, the labelling 
or numbering of individuals is irrelevant (or permutations of 
individuals along with their lots which describe all the relevant 
aspects of the situation, are irrelevant). That may seem obvious, 




























































































introduced is that this re-labelling or permutation can be different in 
different states which other properties (here unanimity) may compare. 
Two states which differ from each other only by such a permutation of 
individuals with their lots are called "permuted states". A state 
"fundamentally dominates" another one if it is unanimously preferred or 
equivalent to one of its permuted states. An assignment is 
"fundamentally dominant" if it fundamentally dominates all other 
assignments. The relation with equity and adequacy will be that each of 
these two properties imply fundamental dominance, while fundamental 
dominance implies each of these two properties if this property can 
exist. These three properties can also be redefined in considering only 
a subset of the assignments (for instance only possible ones, or only 
stable ones in bilateral matching questions), and the mentioned 
relations between the three properties still hold.
The inter-individual comparisons which are implied by adequacy 
and by fundamental dominance can be given a number of meanings which 
are presented in section 4 and include the cases where quantitative 
outcomes are relevant, more generally the question of ordinal 
"fundamental preferences" which enable one to compare different tastes, 
the "ethical observer", problems of bidding, problems of bilateral 
matchings with "fundamentally consistent" sets of individual 
preferences (e.g., marriage as a public good or "monotone sharing" of 
the couple's total income).
The second example of application which we consider in detail 
(after marriage, in section 12) concerns the labor market and wage 
determination, a crucial domain of interference between free exchange 
and equity considerations, with questions concerning the ethical 
quality of the market and the explanation of a number of behavior, 
non-market interferences and wage rigidities. We in particular consider 
Tinbergen-equity (i.e., each worker prefers his job-wage pair to that 
of any other), its possibility and its relations to free exchange.
One interest of the adequacy, equity and fundamental dominance 
properties and of their relations is that these concepts and results 
can (but need not) be applied to the allocation of indivisible items, a 




























































































methods fail but which has important applications (assignments of 
individuals, locations problems, strong increasing returns to scale, 
etc.) .
We may also remark here that this study in particular 
establishes the links between three domains which had hitherto remained 
disconnected: equity (fairness, non-envy, equality of opportunity,
etc.), the social welfare functional (Pareto-Arrow utilitarian "social 
choice"<7>) and the theories of matchings and assignments and their 
applications.
* The paper is organized as follows.Part I provides examples and 
meanings. Section 2 proposes simple illustrative examples of various 
situations. Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss the meanings and scopes of the 
concepts and of their relations. In part II, section 6 provides the 
complete definitions and section 7 states the relations which section 8 
proves. Section 9 relates these criteria to income or welfare
maximization and section 10 shows some properties of fundamental 
dominance. Finally, in part III sections 11 and 12 show applications of 
the concepts and results to the economic theory of marriage and more 
generally of matching markets, and to the properties of 
"Tinbergen-equitable wages" and causes of wage rigidities.
1 - EXAMPLES AND MEANINGS.
2 - Illustrative examples.
Let us assume that a firm has to fill two positions, one for a 
salesman and one for a steelworker, with two of its employees, Jules 
and Jim. "Production" in each job means a contribution to the firm's 
profit, and they are independent of each other. Assume Jules produces 
14 at steelwork and 13 at sales, while Jim produces 11 as a steelworker 
and 12 as a salesman. Then Jules produces more at steelwork than at 
sales while Jim produces more at sales than at steelwork, so Jules is 
assigned to steel and Jim is assigned to sales. Assume now that Jules 
produces 14 as a steelworker and 11 as a salesman, while Jim produces 
13 at steelwork and 12 when he sells. Then while Jules still produces 




























































































more at steelwork than Jim does, while Jim produces more at sales than 
Jules does: steelwork is more efficiently handled by Jules than by Jim, 
and the reverse holds for sales. Thus again Jules is assigned to steel 
and Jim becomes the salesman, but now it is for a different 
intermediary rationale (the ultimate rationale still being the firms's 
maximal profit). This second rationale is not operative in the former 
case since, then, Jules produced more than Jim both at steelwork (14 
against 11) and at sales (13 against 12). Consider now a third case, in 
which Jules produces 12 at steelwork and .11 at sales, while Jim 
produces 11 at steelwork and 12 at sales. Then both rationales justify 
assigning Jules to steel and Jim to sales: Jules produces more at 
steelwork than at sales and than Jim at steelwork, while Jim produces 
more at sales than Jules does and than he himself produces at 
steelwork. Finally consider the situation in which Jules produces 12 at 
steelwork and 13 at^sales, and Jim produces 13 at steelwork and 15 at 
sales. Then assigning Jules to steel and Jim to sales is again the best 
assignment since it produces 12+15=27 while the reverse assignment 
produces only 13+13=26. Yet, none of the above rationales works since 
steelworker Jules is outperformed both by salesman Jules and by 
steelworker Jim.
This assignment situation and these figures can also have other 
meanings. For instance,’ the figures may represent the 
individuals’earnings in each occupation. It may be that each one earns 
more in his occupation than he would earn in the other one, or than the 
other individual would earn in this occupation, or both, or, also, no 
assignment may have any of these two properties. Alternatively, the 
figures may measure in "utils" the satisfactions that each job provides 
for each individual, and it may be satisfaction derived from both 
performing the job and receiving the corresponding wage. The logic may 
be similar but it may then acquire another meaning, of ethical nature. 
We now consider cases of this type, and productivity is assumed to be 
irrelevant (for example it is no longer the problem; or each employee 
performs equally well in each job; or, in each job, they each perform 
equally well; or, if wages can vary according to jobs, to individuals 
or both, these equalities in each job or of each worker hold for 
performances which are the contributions to the firm's profit taking 




























































































14 and selling at 13, while Jim values selling at 12 and steelworking 
at 11, in the assignment of steel to Jules and of sales to Jim each one 
prefers his lot to the other’s lot: this is what is classically called 
equity ( 8 } . If Jules values steelworking at 14 and selling at 11, while 
Jim values steelworking at 13 and selling at 12, assigning steel to 
Jules and sales to Jim is no longer "equitable" since Jim prefers 
steelworking. But it allocates steel to the individual who enjoys it 
the most (14 against 13), and it also allocates sales to the individual 
who enjoys it the most (12 against 11). We call such an allocation 
adequate, a term which we also apply to the corresponding case of the 
previous paragraph. Notice also that, in the first situation, this 
assignment is not "adequate" since it allocates sales to Jim who values 
this job at 12 while Jules values it at 13. But an allocation can also 
be both equitable and adequate, as is the case with steelworking for 
Jules and sales for Jim if Jules values steelworking at 12 and selling 
at 11, while Jim values selling at 12 and steelworking at 11.And it can 
also be neither equitable nor adequate, as is for example the case of 
steel for Jules and sales for Jim when Jules values steelworking at 12 
and selling at 13, while Jim values steelworking at 13 and whatever may 
be his valuation of sales (or, alternatively, while Jim values sales at 
12 and whatever may be his valuation of steelworking). This is easily 
verified.
We can also check that in all cases where one assignment is 
equitable or adequate, the other one is neither equitable nor adequate. 
Indeed this property is general if the two figures are not the same for 
at least one individual and at least one job. Obviously, the two 
alternative assignments cannot then be both equitable or both adequate. 
But, also, if steel for Jules and sales for Jim were equitable, and 
sales for Jules and steel for Jim were adequate, the figures would have 
to satisfy :
Steel for Jules > sales for Jules > sales for Jim > steel for 
Jim > steel for Jules
which is impossible if the four figures are not all equal (and 
similarly if each assignment had the other property).
We remark that equity and adequacy have one property in common. 




























































































then each of the two figures of this assignment is not lower than one 
of the two figures of the opposite assignment — a different one for 
each of the first two figures—  (indeed, for equity, steel for 
Jules > sales for Jules and sales for Jim > steel for Jim, and for 
adequacy, steel for Jules > steel for Jim and sales for Jim > sales for 
Jules). These two kinds of dominance are"indistinguishable if the 
ordering of the outcomes (the two figures) in each assignment is 
irrelevant whatever may be their given ordering in the other assignment 
(the orderings of the outcomes are "independently irrelevant"). This 
is, for example, the case when the outcomes are additive contributions 
to profits, or for "impartial" ethical judgments if this irrelevance 
defines impartiality. When the outcomes are individuals'utilities and 
for ethical judgment, this general dominance is the necessary result of 
unanimity plus this impartiality (and this impartiality is closely 
linked to the assumed interpersonal comparability of utilities, as will 
be discussed further below).
When there is any number n of individuals, and for situations 
which are still relevantly and sufficiently characterized by a figure 
for each individual (such as, for example, his contribution to profits 
or his utility level as in the above examples), situation 1
"fundamentally dominates" situation 2 if there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the n figures in situation 1 and the n figures 
in situation 2 such that, in each pair, the situation 2 figure is not 
larger than the situation 1 figure(9 ’ . In particular consider 
assignment problems between n individuals and n lots, where allocating 
a lot to an individual (or the converse) generates such a figure 
(profit or utility, etc.). Then the assignment is "fundamentally 
dominant" if it fundamentally dominates all the other assignments. If 
n=2, we have noticed that both equitable and adequate assignments are 
fundamentally dominant, and, indeed, any fundamentally dominant 
assignment is obviously either equitable or adequate. For n>2, we see 
easily that any equitable or adequate assignment is fundamentally 
dominant (compare the "individual plus lot" pairs with the same 
individual in the case of equity, and with the same lot in the case of 
adequacy). But with n>2, an assignment can be fundamentally dominant 
without being either equitable or adequate. This is the case, for 




























































































supervision, if the relevant figures produced by each individual in 
each job (such as independent contribution to profit or the 
individual's utility) are the ones given by the matrix of table 1.
steelwork sales supervision
Jules 11 12 10
Jim 10 13 10
Jane 10 14 15
Table 1
Indeed, among the six possible assignments, assigning steel to Jules, 
sales * to Jim and supervision to Jane fundamentally dominates each of 
the five other ones since it yields (11,13,15) while the other ones 
respectively yield (11,14,10) (steel to Jules, sales to Jane, 
supervision to Jim, equivalent to (10,11,14)), (10,12,15), (10,14,10) 
(equivalent to (10,10,14)), (10,12,10) and (10,13,10). Yet this 
assignment is not equitable since Jules yields 11 at steel while he 
would yield 12 at sales, and it is not adequate since sales yield 13 in 
Jim’s hands while they would yield 14 if performed by Jane. Moreover, 
we can check that none of the six assignments is equitable or adequate 
(if one had any of these two properties, then any fundamentally 
dominant assignment would also have this property, as we shall see).
A final example will introduce markets. Assume that the two 
jobs steelworking and sales are offered by two different firms, a 
steelmill and a shop, who compete for hiring Jules or Jim. Assume also 
that the surplus produced by a worker at a job is equally divided 
between the worker and the firm (the proportions could be different, 
but they are fixed by custom or by fairness considerations). Assume 
finally that Jules produces 18 at steel and 15 at sales, while Jim 
generates 16 at steel and 12 at sales. The arrangement of Jules at 
sales and Jim at steel cannot be the stable outcome of a free 
competitive market. Indeed, if the steelmill hires Jules rather than 
Jim it gains 9(=18/2) instead of 8, while Jules prefers working at the 
steelmill where his wage is 9 rather than at the shop where he earns, 
only 8. On the contrary, the opposite arrangement of Jules at steel and 
Jim at sales is a stable competitive market outcome. Indeed, on the one 




























































































drop from 9 to 8, and on the other hand, the steelmill would lose by 
replacing Jules with Jim since its profit would drop from 9 to 8. This 
is the manifestation of the general property shown below that, in such 
a framework with any number of workers and jobs, there is one and only 
one stable market outcome. Furthermore, this stable market outcome may 
not maximize total income and thus total"- workers' income or total 
firms’income, since in this example total income is 18+12=30 for the 
stable market outcome while for the reverse assignment it is 16+16=32. 
These properties are to be compared with the classical results of the 
matching markets problem: on the one hand, with independent individual 
preferences on both sides of the market (the "marriage" problems of 
Gale ^nd Shapley,1962) there generally are several stable outcomes, two 
of which are each equitable among stable outcomes for the agents on one 
side of the market (it thus maximizes these agents'total income on 
stable outcomes); on the other hand, with endogenous wage-profit 
sharing there generally is only one stable assignment which maximizes 
total income. If, in the example, Jim's production at sales is raised 
from 12 to 18, then the stability properties will not change, but the 
stable outcome will be equitable and adequate and will maximize total 
income.
3 - Relations, meanings, definition.
The properties observed in these examples will be proven for 
any finite number of individuals and lots, any orderings and any 
possible restrictions on the set of assignments. In particular, if in 
assigning given lots to given individuals both equitable assignments 
and adequate assignments can exist, then each assignment which has one 
of these properties also has the other one. But there can also exist 
equitable assignments and no adequate ones, or adequate assignments and 
no equitable ones, or neither an equitable nor an adequate assignment, 
as the above examples have shown. Thus, if both equity and adequacy can 
exist, these properties will compound their meanings in the same 
assignments. Hence, when only one of these properties can exist, it can 
be considered as an extension of the other property to problems where 
the latter is ineffective. Furthermore, since equity or adequacy imply 
fundamental dominance while fundamental dominance can exist with 




























































































an extension of equity or of adequacy for problems where these 
properties or criteria are ineffective.
These logical relations are valuable since in most applications 
these properties have quite different semantic requirements (i.e., what 
is necessary for each of them to be meaningful), quite different 
ethical meanings when they are given an ethical interpretation, more 
generally different normative meanings, and they also have different 
scopes of logical applicability and of existence, and from all these 
viewpoints different strong points and different limitations. The 
discussion of these aspects is essential, although we wish to keep it 
here .to the strict minimum. Consider for instance the ethical reasons 
for considering these properties. "Minimal reflective equilibrium" 
implies at least making explicit the following remarks.
Equity, adequation and fundamental dominance are ordinal 
properties in the sense that they require only ordinal comparisons of 
pairs of an individual and a lot.
Consider equity in its classical meaning, that is, defined with 
individuals’preferences. i,j,... are indices of individuals. Individual 
i has the lot x i and the preference ordering > (preferred or
iindifferent to). Equity is x. > x i for all i,j. We shall add below
ipossible restrictions of the comparisons of the assignments of the 
x i ’s. Equity is interesting because it has a set of more basic 
meaningful properties. Each of these properties comes from equity being 
implied by some fact or implying it. These basic properties belong to 
three categories. The most important category constitutes its cautious, 
sensible and diffuse egalitarianism. The second one is related to 
unanimity and exchange among re-assignments. The third one is its 
minimal requirements with respect to preferences. We consider them in 
reverse order.
A- Preference requirements.
1) Equity does not require any inter-individual comparability of 
individual preferences.




























































































of individual preference orderings.
B - Unanimity and exchange.
1) Equity implies unanimity in the sense of unanimous preference (or 
indifference) over all considered reassignments of lots. It is thus 
in particular Pareto-efficient in the set of these assignments.
2) Equity implies stability (or equilibrium) with respect to 
unanimously accepted or desired reassiqnments (strictly desired by 
at least one individual),; that is, no such reassignment is 
possible from an equitable situation. In particular no two-by-two 
voluntary exchange of lots is possible from an equitable situation.
C - Egalitarianism. Equity can be called utilitarist, preference- 
respecting, ordinal, non-interpersonally-comparable egalitarianism. Its 
meaningful, cautious and multi-faceted egalitarianism is its main claim 
to our consideration. Its cautious aspect comes from properties A: 
reliance only on ordinal, non-intercomparable individual preferences. 
Its egalitarianism comes from several of its properties. It should 
firstly be emphasized that egalitarianism in general (1) can be defined 
on different variables with consequences which can be different or even 
opposed (allocations, welfares, rights, freedoms, weights of utility, 
etc.), (2) can be held for bad or good reasons, and (3) can be 
considered as an end in itself or as a means to something else. 
Jealousy and envy are generally considered bad reasons for desiring 
equality. An aesthetic taste for symmetry is not an acceptable reason 
either. On the other hand, to satisfy certain minimal needs or freedoms 
of the worse-off and of the least free people may justify some not too 
unequal distributions and equalizing constraints or transfers. And the 
only acceptable justification for equality as an end is the "principle 
of unsufficient inegalitarian reason": equality is chosen when there is 
no good reason for inequality (this is a logical justification, but 
deciding what reasons are good or not is an ethical choice110M . 
^ Finally, equality may be sought for the sake of social peace and
harmony in the presence of propensities to jealousy, envy or sentiments 




























































































1) Equity is an extension of "equality of opportunity"* 1 1 * . If 
individuals have the same possibility set and freedom to choose, their 
resulting individual choices will be equitable (since each individual 
could choose a lot identical to the one of any other and he prefers the 
one he chooses). But this complete equality of opportunity may be 
impossible (for instance, individuals have different talents). Equity, 
then, is this extension.
2) With equity, each individual is not worse off than he would be 
with any other individual’s let.
3) «With equity, no individual receives a lot that some other 
individual would prefer to his own. That is not a morally good 
egalitarian reason.
4) Equity is symmetrical bilateral reciprocity for each pair of 
individuals and each pair of lots, in that each individual does not 
prefer the other's lot.
5) Equity is the identical preference or indifference of all 
individuals over all r e as si eminent s of lets between them.
6) If all lots are equal in the sense of identical, the situation is 
equitable. Yet, this equality may be impossible; or it may fail to have 
some otherwise desired property such as Pareto-efficiency, or the 
allocation of certain situations or commodities to certain individuals 
ffor reasons of need or respect of rights or of freedom of action or 
exchange, etc). Then, if equity is possible, or if it is furthermore 
consistent with these properties, the situation can have the equity 
property of this allocative equality, plus eventually the other 
required properties. Equity thus can be an extension of equality when 
equality is impossible or baa for some reason.
7) If all individual preference orderings were identical, equity 
would mean that all individual lots are in the same indifference 
locus11*1. If furthermore these orderings could be represented by the 
same utility function (with some specifications of the ordinal 




























































































level — the same welfare level if that were the meaning of this 
utility.Thus, equity can be considered as an extension of equal utility 
or equal welfare when these expressions are meaningless because 
individual preferences are not comparable.
8) If the problem is to divide a given quantity of a desired 
commodity, equity yields equal division. Thus equity is an extension of 
equal division when the nature of the lots is more complex so as to 
permit differences in individual preference orderings.
9) Equity describes a certain non-envy or non-jealousy*13 * . However, 
these sentiments have the following ethical features.
a) It is generally considered that the envious or jealous individual 
is responsible for his sentiment of envy or jealousy. Therefore, for 
example, such a sentiment per se is not considered a good reason for 
this individual to receive more at the detriment of somebody else.
b) Envy is not considered a good sentiment, it is considered that 
the the envious person is to be blamed for it. (J.S. Mill calls envy 
"that most odious and anti-social of all passions" in On Liberty). Thus 
to accept that envy influences the state of society may even be a 
particularly immoral social choice.
c) Yet, precisely because envy is considered ugly, an envy-less 
society is better, all other things being equal (the sentiments which 
exist in a society are certainly relevant and important aspects for 
judging the society).
d) Envy and jealousy are common-causes of latent and open strife and 
hostility in the society. Thus non-envy and non-jealousy may be sought 
for the sake of peace and social harmony.
The last two reasons are second best ones: they hold given that 
these sentiments exist, given that moral education, preaching and 
appeal to reason fail to suppress them.




























































































more directly since it rests on a capacity to say whether it is better 
that some lot is attributed to some individual or to some other (a 
capacity that is in particular implied by any allocative judgment which 
can compare all distributions). And fundamental dominance results, we 
have seen, from unanimity (or its equivalent for the relevant 
individual-dependent orderings) and independent impartiality. 
Section 10 below shows a deep meaning of fundamental dominance: it is 
an extension of the two-individual meaningful comparisons of variations 
in ordinal utility to the cases with any number of individuals. 
However, both adequacy and fundamental dominance (for independent 
impartiality) require inter-individual comparisons. That may or may not 
raise a problem, depending on the case. This is the topic of the next 
section. But we first need some notation.
Again integers i,j,..., are indices of individuals and x. 
represents the lot of individual i. But we now add ŷ  which represents 
a sufficient set of characteristics of individual i. (In other words, 
Y { is what i is and x̂  is what i has). Thè expression (x̂  , ŷ  ) means 
individual k with the lot x  ̂ of individual j. We also have a preference 
ordering with preference, indifference, or preference or indifference, 
represented respectively by >, >.The situation is adequate if 
x i ,yi > x i ,yj for a11 i ' ì ’
It is equitable if
xi , y i > Xj , Y l for all i, j
(this is the classical definition of equity if for each i this
expression represents xt > x̂  where > is individual i1s preference
ordering). Since, for given x i ' s and ŷ  's for all i 's, the set with 
elements (x̂  »Yk ) is denumerable, for defining equity or adequacy the 
ordering > is representable by a utility function u. Then, writing 
u(Xj ,yk)=u* and considering the matrix of the u* with row j and 
column k, adequacy means that the principal diagonal dominates in rows 
while equity means that it dominates in columns. Finally, g(i) and x(i) 
denoting permutations of the indices and Tcr(i) denoting the product of 
o(i) by x(i), the situation is fundamentally dominant if for each o
there exists a t such that, for all i ' s,
x . ' Y . > x , y or ul> uT< 1l i t <r(
(or alternatively x.,y > x , yi ~ r ( l ) J t  <r( i ) or uli> uT^(Tl i




























































































the condition becomes equity in the first formulation (and adequacy in 
the alternative one); and if and only if it can be t=o" 1 for each cr, 
the condition becomes adequacy in the first formulation (and equity in 
the alternative one).
4 - Examples and cases of applicability.
We now propose a few examples to suggest possible domains of 
relevance of these concepts. The question of relevance can be posed at 
two levels: meaningfulness of the comparisons of situations (i.e., 
meaningfulness of the ordering and, in particular, of its comparison 
across individuals), and meaningfulness of the properties (adequacy, 
equity, fundamental dominance and others introduced later, such as 
fundamental efficiency, free-exchange stability, etc.).
A - Attributions. Comparing the attribution of a lot to various 
individuals is sometimes banal. For instance, most people would say 
that a book in Japanese is more useful if attributed to someone who can 
read Japanese rather than to someone who cannot. Then,if we consider 
that to allocate the book is to assign the two lots "the book" and 
"nothing", giving the book to the Japanese reader is adequate. It is 
also equitable if the individual who cannot read the book does not care 
for it (assuming that the Japanese reader profits from or enjoys 
reading the book). However, if the non-reader would prefer even 
slightly to have the book (for instance for decoration or for the 
paper), this allocation is no longer equitable in the classical sense, 
although it might remain adequate.
B - Quantitative outcomes. Another example which applies to a number of 
cases occurs when the relevant effect of attributing lot xj to 
individual k is a monetary benefit, net gain or cost saved (or loss) 
v^, independent from the attribution of the other lots to the other 
individuals. If these benefits are received by the same agent, then we 
have an extension of the first example of section 2 to any number of 
individuals (and any cause of the gains). If the benefit created by the 
attribution of x̂  to individual k (i.e., by the pairing /Yk) accrues 
to individual k, then equity has its classical meaning. These 




























































































receives the benefits, the idea that, other things being equal, it is 
better to attribute x̂  to individual i than to individual j if vj >v-J is 
a widespread ethical position, expressed by the argument that 
individual i makes a better use of x̂  than individual j does. If these 
benefits accrue to different individuals amongst whom additional 
lump-sum transfers are possible, this view can be related to 
Pareto-efficiency. Yet, it is often held even without such transfers. 
In economics, this is related to several classical discussions 
(Hicks’welfare criterion, Posner's wealth maximization criterion, 
etc.). Then adequacy which takes the v* as a specification of the u* is 
a meaningful concept. Also, in a number of cases, the relation > can be 
> concerning quantities of an output, or economized quantities of an 
input, if that is the relevant variable. When the v* are homogeneous 
quantities like incomes, quantities of an output, etc., the total sum 
Z v^( i ̂ and the conditions of its maximum (minimum for inputs or costs 
saved) are often relevant aspects.
C - Bidding. When v* is the money value of lot j for individual k, it 
can be the (maximum potential) bid that individual k is ready to offer 
for lot j. Then, in this sense, one can say that the assignment is 
adequate when each lot is attributed to its highest bidder, and that it 
is equitable when each individual receives the lot for which he offers 
his highest bid (with possibilities of ties). The result shown below 
says that it may be that only one, or the other, or both, or none of 
the two properties are possible, but that if both are possible any 
assignment which has one property also has the other. In this case an 
auction market achieves both properties0 4 ’ .
D - Matchings. The equity-adequacy properties and relations also apply 
to the important "double equity" properties in bilateral matchings with 
fundamentally consistent individual preferences, that is to say to the 
following case. A bilateral matching is an assignment problem between 
two groups of n agents each. Each of the 2 n agents has a preference 
ordering over his possible partners. Examples are monogamous marriage, 
assignment of workers to firms, of plants to locations with land 
owners, of houses with owners to tenants or to buyers, etc. Cases when 
one agent can have several partners (several workers to firms, 
ownership of several houses on land tracts, etc.) can be reduced to 




























































































additively decomposable with respect to these items. The outcome of 
each pairing is assumed to directly concern only this pair of agents. 
The "fundamental consistency" of individual preferences means that 
these n2 outcomes can be classified in an order of desirableness with 
which each agent agrees for his ordering of the n possible outcomes of 
his own matchings with the others (in fact? it may be that only a 
subset of the pairings are considered). If i and i' are agents on each 
side, (ii') denoting their pairing and > being agent i 's preference
iordering, this fundamental consistency can also be defined by the 
impossibility, for any set of the considered pairs, of relations such 
as ii'>ij’> jj’>ji’> ii’with strict preference in at least one of the
• i J' j T'four relations. Fundamental consistency often results from the fact 
that the relevant outcome of each pairing can be sufficiently described 
by a quantity that both agents prefer to be higher or lower: an income, 
a quantity of a product, a cost or a quantity of an input saved. This 
is in particular the case in the two situations of monotone sharing or 
of joint consumption of this quantity by these two agents. Monotone 
sharing means that this quantity (product or income received or cost to 
be paid by the pair) is shared by the two agents in such a way that an 
agent receives (or pays) more when he is in a pair which receives (or 
pays) more. For example, an agent could receive (or pay) a proportion 
of the income (or cost) which is the same for all agents on one side, 
or even for all agents — then it is one half. Such "splits" are 
frequent, with proportions determined bycustom, past bargaining or 
considerations of fairness. One sees that it is quite usual to have 
monotone sharing of the worker's productivity between profit and wage, 
of economic land rent between the land-owner and the firm, of the 
tenant's willingness to pay between himself and the house owner, etc. 
The joint consumption case means that this quantity is a public good 
for the two paired agents. In section 11 we shall argue that marriage 
tends to be of the joint consumption or of the monotone sharing type.
In these cases, the equity-adequacy properties refer to equity 
on each side of the matching. Furthermore, in such problems the results 
of free exchange choices or market situations are often an important 
question which has notable relations with the equity structures. Also, 
when the relevant outcomes are quantities of the same good (incomes, 




























































































conditions for maximal total income or product or minimal total cost. 
Moreover, not all assignments and in particular pairings may be 
relevant (for instance possible or stable). There can be equity on one 
side (mono-equity), on both sides (bi-equity), or on none. A result is 
that if for each side equity is possible, then all equity is bi-equity. 
Furthermore, any equity maximizes total income or product (or minimizes 
total cost) if that is the relevant variable. Also, as an example in 
section 2 has suggested, there generally is only one stable outcome 
(market equilibrium), which may not maximize total product. These 
results are proven in section 11 as an application of the general 
properties.
E - An "ethical observer". In other applications of the structures and 
properties considered here, the relation > represents ethical 
evaluations of an "ethical observer", perhaps describing his views 
about welfare comparisons. If the ordering >Yl > xj , , for given i,
coincides with x. > , this observer "respects" individual i 's
ipreferences on the relevant domain, and the relation x ,y > x ,y are 
his inter-individual comparisons.
F - Fundamental preferences. Furthermore, if, for a given set of 
individuals i, a domain X9x (which includes the lots x i ) , and 
individual i 's preferences > comparing the x, there exist sets of
icharacteristics y and an ordering > independent of i such that the 
(x,y ) for given i are ordered by > as the x are ordered by >, for each
ru ~1i, we call > a "fundamental preference ordering" for this problem (and 
work with it is "fundamental analysis"). The existence of a fundamental 
ordering is unproblematic in many situations (for example in the 
"quantitative outcome" case, where the relevant variable of each 
attribution of a lot to an individual is a quantity of the same 
variable — money gain, loss or cost, or a given output or input—  which 
all individuals prefer to be either larger or smaller). For fundamental 
preferences, or for an ethical observer respecting individual 
preferences, the y i are sets of characteristics which sufficiently 
correlate with individuals i 's preferences. In particular, yt can be 





























































































as ordering pairs (xi,>), giving a meaning 
i
to comparisons such as (xt ,>) > (xj , |>| ’ ), with
i ~ 'i7
(xt ,>) > (X; ,>> ~ xt > x; 
i ~ i i(and corresponding formulations with a fundamental or ethical utility 
functional u[xi,ui (.)]). The questions raised by the existence of a 
fundamental or ethical ordering > depend on the extent and homogeneity 
of the set of individuals i, and on the lots x  ̂ and domain X. An 
ethical observer's ordering can always be assumed. But it is even 
possible to assume that a fundamental preference ordering exists for 
any set of individuals (in the strict sense, "physical" ones) and any 
X. Thi#s is a presupposition about human rationality. To adopt it is to 
take a position in philosophical anthropology (i.e., about "human 
nature"). As several other, more usual, basic presuppositions about 
human rationality (transitivity of choice, existence of preferences and 
their relation to action, free will, etc.), this one cannot be "proven" 
true or false for several reasons, and its justification largely relies 
on its eventual fruitfulness. Indeed, this assumption is often fruitful 
or even necessary both for explaining differences in "tastes" and in 
resulting choices and actions, and for normative inter-individual 
comparisons of individual orderings or utilities. This philosophical 
discussion is beyond our scope here. In many questions the relevant 
differences between the y 's are clearly definable. Unavoidably, all 
works in theoretical, empirical or applied economics which consider 
causes of variations in tastes across individuals use some kind of 
fundamental preferences. This probably covers hundreds of studies, and 
they do it without prior discussion1 1 5 ) .Also, an ordinal fundamental 
ordering is necessarily implied by the rather usual common-speech 
assertions or assumptions that someone is or can be happier, more 
satisfied, better off, etc. than someone else.
G - The general case of a deep ordering structure.
Problems with either fundamental preferences, quantitative 
outputs (income, wealth, product, cost saved, etc.), matchings with 
fundamentally consistent preferences (e.g., because of joint 
consumption or monotone sharing), or an "ethical observer" respecting 




























































































which is sufficient for some of the crucial properties shown below. 
With i,j=l,...n, there are 2n orderings of pairs (ij), one for each 
given i or j, written > and > and similarly for index j. We say that
* ithese 2n orderings are "fundamentally consistent" or that they manifest 
a deep or fundamental ordering structure, when each is a projection of 
the same "fundamental ordering" of the pairs" (ij), at given i or j. 
This can be expressed in two equivalent ways. Either there exists an 
ordering of the pairs (ij), the "fundamental ordering", written as 
and >, such that ij>ik <=> ij>ik and ij>-£j <=> ij>-€j for all
i j ~Or, for all i,j,k,^, we do not have the set of relations ij>ik,
iik>^k, -€k>.£ j , -€j>ij with the strict relation > or > or > or > in at
least one case. Then the properties studied here have meaning and their 
relations hold. These orderings can also be defined on only a subset of 
the n2 pairs ij.
5 - Summarized examples of situations.
In particular, when fundamental preferences or an analogous 
structure (quantitative output, ethical observer, etc.) exists for a 
given question and given situations, this has two consequences. First, 
adequacy is a meaningful property. Second, if the corresponding 
characteristics y^ contain all the relevant reasons for discriminating 
between the various individuals in each of the situations which the 
allocation problem compares (rather than in all these situations taken
together), then a permutation of the i in a situation, transforming
each (x( ,y, ) into (x ,y ) while this operation is not performed 
in the other situations, does not change the comparison problem;then 
there is "independent irrelevance" of permutations, and fundamental 
dominance of a situation over another one is equivalent to the 
corresponding unanimous preference or equivalence.
Before considering the general case, let us summarize some 
examples of structural possibilities. Tables 2 and 3 consider cases 
with two individuals (and two lots). Table 2 recalls possible






























































































u1 U1 U2 u21 1 2
equitable and not adequate 4 3 1 2
adequate and not equitable 4 1 3 2
both equitable and adequate 2 1 1 2
neither equitable nor adequate 2 3 3 any
neither equitable nor adequate 2 3 any 2
Table 2
Table 3 considers together the two possible assignments (xi
to 1, x n to 2), and (x to 1, x to 2) and it shows some examples of 2 2 1
possible and impossible situations.
u1 > u1 1 2 V V
u1 > u11 2V V
u2 < u2 1 2
u11 > u12V A
u21 > u22
u11 > U12V A
u21 < u22
ul1 > u12A V
u21 < u2
There is neither any equitable nor any adequate assignment.
One assignment is equitable, none is adequate.
One assignment is adequate, none is equitable.
The same assignment is both equitable and adequate.
One assignment is equitable and inadequate, the other one is
adequate and inequitable.
Table 3
The inequalities show that the last exhibited situation in table 3 is 
impossible.




























































































individuals. Choose u* 's such that, for all i 's, uj= 2i-l, uj+^= 2i, 
u* = 0 for j^i,i + l. Then, the brackets {) denoting for all i 's, the 
assignment {xi , }  is adequate but inequitable, and the assignment 
{xt + i ,yi } is equitable but inadequate. Indeed, uj >u| for all jjrf. and 
all i but u1 <u1 , and u1 >u* for all j?d.+l and all i but u1 <u* + 1
(table 4).
1 0  0 0 
2 3 0 0 
0 4 5 0 
0 0 6 7
Table 4
However, we shall see that this kind of situation is impossible 
if n is finite (in accordance with the last example exhibited in the 
n=2 case) — it can happen with n infinite only because in {x_ ^  ,y[ } the 
individual who receives xi cannot be designated.
II - BASIC RELATIONS.
6 _ Definitions and notation.
irjfkrl are indices ranging over the n first integers: l,...n. 
cr(i) is one of the n! permutations of the n first integers. cr=l is the 
identity permutation, cr', cr" , etc. are other such n-permutations. 
xt and are respectively lots and characteristics of individuals.
is a pair (x̂  #Yk) of a lot and of an individual defined by his 
characteristics. z= {z. }= ( , . .  . zq ) is a n-tuple of elements z i for all 
i=l,...n. We denote
and
crz = {z > = z
1 «■< i  ) * < r i  1 )
cr= (x , y )<*•< i ) i
= < o (X -y. > —* V ^w< 1 ) ' - 1'' ’ ~ n >






























































































x , and thus represents an assignment between the n individuals<*■( i )
and the n lots.
We remark that
- icrz 9 = (x, ,y ).•••(* .y_ ).
We call p 
corresponding z^:
a set of n-permutations, |p{ < n!, and R the set of
cr€p <=* z^E R.
We shall consider only crEp and z^E R, which will lead to 
concepts of R-equity, R-adequacy, R-fundamental dominance. A particular 
case *is when p is the (unrestricted) set of the n! n-permutations. R 
stands for "restricted". An important application is when R is the set 
of possible assignments (we then speak of realistic equity, adequacy 
and fundamental dominance). Indeed, some assignments may be impossible 
for many possible reasons (depending on the actual problem( 1 6 ) , and 
comparisons involving impossible ones may be irrelevant. In another 
application, developed in section 11 below, R is the set of stable 
matchings. A priori a smaller R (or p ) is more favorable to the 
existence of assignments having the considered properties, as the 
definitions will make clear.
There is a "fundamental" ordering, with usual notation >,>, 
which compares pairs { x i ,ŷ  ) (it suffices that it can compare them for 
the same y o n  the one hand and for the same xi on the other, for all j 
and i, since comparing (x{ , y i ) and (xk ,y^) can be deduced from 
comparing (xt ,yj) with (xR , y i ) and (xk ,yj ) with (xR ,y^)). That is, 
the fundamental ordering compares elements of type z. .
Given z={zi) and z’ = {zj}, we write
z ~ z' iff z ~ zj , V i ,
Z>Z' iff Zt>zj » Vi ,
z > z' iff z > z' and not z~z' (i.e., Vi:zt>z’ , and 3i:z,>zj).
We say that z is fundamentally equivalent to z' and write 
zfez' iff 3 ^ ' z  ~  crz' .




























































































z f d z '  iff 3 o : z > 0z ' ( 1 7 1 .
Consider the assignment z1 = { (xt , y ) } = (xt , y ) , .. . (x> , ŷ  ) .
We say that z1 is R-fundamentally dominant and write 
z16 F or l€f iff z1 € R (or X€p) and z1 fdz<T for all o'ep .
We say that z1 is R-eguitable and write 
z1 € E or l€e iff z1 € R (or l€p) and z1 > z^ for all cr€p.
We say that z1 is R-adeguate and write 
z‘€ A or l€a iff z^ €R (or lep) and z‘> o"‘z<' for all o€p.
S
Obviously, F£R and fCp, EQl and eCp, A£R and a£p . We also have 
E£F and e^f, and A^F and aCf from the definitions (for each element of 
e,. or of a, the fundamental dominance over each crep is respectively 
with permutation 1, or o'*1 ) .
We can now state the properties.
7 - Properties.
Theorem.
1 - If there exists one /^-equitable and one J?-adequats assignments,
each assignment which has one of these properties also has the 
other.
2 - If there exists one fl-equitable assignment, each .R-fundamentally
dominant assignment is R-equitable.
3 - If there exists one ^-adequate assignment, each ^-fundamentally
dominant assignment is fl-adequate.
That is,
E?<0 and => E=A
E^0 =* F=E
A?<0 -» F=A.
Therefore, there are only five a priori possible situations,
F=0,
































































































These properties can be proven in several ways. The following 
way is certainly the simplest. In addition, it has the intrinsic 
interest of considering a "social welfare function" of the form it 
necessarily has in this problem.
For given n x i and n , the set of the (x̂  , yk), which the 
fundamental ordering orders, has at most n2 distinct elements, it is 
thus denumerable, and this ordering is therefore representable by an 
ordinal utility function u (x ,yk) or u(zt). We consider any 
specification of this function, and any symmetrical, increasing, ftn -t> ft 
function of the u(zi) for i=l,...n, W[{u(zi)}]. We then denote 
w'- W[{u (X<t(1) ,y4 )}] (18> ,
p. = max ,
crep
m is the set of cr such that w°= \x (m£p) ,
M is the set of z0- such that o' € m (MOD .
We then have the following
Lemma.
S standing for F or E or A, S ^ 0 ■» S=M (or s standing for f,e or 
a, st£8 -» s=m) .
That is, the assignments which maximize W on R are the 
R-fundamentally dominant ones, or the R-equitable ones, or the 
R-adequate ones,if, respectively, there exists at least one assignment 
in R having this specific property.
The theorem results straightforwardly from the lemma.




























































































carefully. The lemma is proven if we prove that {l€s and q€s) =» w1 = w°\ 
and {lEs and crep-s) => w1 >w°' for s being respectively f ,  e or a.
Fundamental dominance. l€f and oep => z1 df z^ (from the 
definition of f) ==> w1 ̂ w*’ (since W is symmetrically increasing) .Thus 
{l€f and q€f) => {w1 > w^ and w ^ w 1 } => w1 =w<T. Furthermore, {lef and 
cr€p-f} => 3&’ such that zx> q’z^. Indeed, {lef and q€p-f c p} => 3cr
such that z ' ^ c r ’ z *  (from the definition of f) . And {z1^ cr’z^ and 
lef) => cref since, for all cr" €p, {z1 df z*" and z1 ~ cr’ z ^ }  => z crd f z <r“
(since {z1 >cr z*’" and z1 ~ cr’ z^} => z q 1 v ẑ " with cr1 v = q’ _ 1 q ) . 
Finally, z*> cr’z'’’ => w1 > w*- since W is symmetrical increasing. Thus 
{l€f and crep-f} =* w1 >w^.
Equity. {l€e and q£p) => z l '>z<T from the definition of e. Thus
{l€e and cr€e} ==> z1 ̂ z^ => w1 = w0-. Furthermore, {l€e and
q£p-e} ==> z*> z^. Indeed, {lGe and qep-e Ç p) => z1 >z ̂ . And {z1'v. z* and
l£e) => cr€e, since defl£e c=> {z‘> z cr’ ,\/cr' ep) <=> {z”> defz<r’ , va’ €p} <=> q€e.
Finally, z1 > z ^  ==> w1 >w<T since W is increasing. Thus, {16e and
cr ep -e ) => w1 >w<r.
Adequacy. ClGa and qep} => z1 >q ":1z" (from the definition of a)
=> w1 > w" (since W is symmetrical increasing). Thus {lea and
crea) ==> w1=wcr. Furthermore, {l€a and q€p--a) => z1 >q ' 1z^. Indeed, {lea
and cr€p-a Q p} ==> z1 >q ~ l z <T. And {z1 ~ cr ~ 1 z cr and l€a) => q€a, since
def , 7 , deflea <===> {z*>q "1 z^ ,vq ep} <=> { q ^ z ^  q “1 z<r ,vq’€p) <=> q€a.
Finally, z1 > cr ~lz°’ => w1 > w^ since W is symmetrical increasing. Thus
{l€a and q€p-a) =̂ > w1 >w,:r.
Q.E.D.
9 - Maximal global welfare or income.
The function W has the general form of a "social welfare 
function", which respects individuals' preference (since it is a 
function of z only through the u ( z ^ )  and is increasing in each u(zi)) 
and is "impartial" in the sense that it is symmetrical in the z i . This 
"impartiality" is a necessary consequence of using a fundamental 




























































































possible function is Zu(zl), which is meaningful only when adding the 
u(z4) is, for instance when they are incomes v* as discussed above (or 
quantities of an output, or economized costs or quantities of an 
input). The lemma thus leads to the following properties.
Properties.
maximize any social welfare function respecting individual
preferences, and impartial, on the assignments in R.
When the relevant effect of each pairing is to produce an income
(car a quantity of an output), the corresponding R-equitable,
R-adeguate and R-fundamentally dominant allocations maximize global
income (or output) on the assignments in R (and eguivalent
properties hold for minimizing costs or guantities of an input).
■ Fundamental dominance as generalizing the comparisons of
variations in fundamental ordinal utility.
This section briefly presents a few aspects, properties and 
consequences of fundamental dominance which further justify the 
interest of this concept.
With z1=(x4,yl) , z={zA) (i=l,...n), we define "z strictly
deffundamentally dominates z'" by zsfdz'<=> {3o* such that z > crz'} or 
z sfdz'<=> {z fdz' and not zfez'}. The relations zfdz', zfez' and zsfaz' 
constitute the corresponding relations of an (incomplete) ordering. The 
transitivity properties result directly from the definitions, and 
anti-symmetry " zsfdz’=> not z'sfdz " (and non-reflexivity "not zsfdz") 
can be proven in several ways. When the ordering > on the z. is
r>j 1
representable by a utility function u(C), the simplest way is to 
consider as above a symmetrical increasing function W, for which 
zsfdz'=> W[{u( ) } ]>W[ {u(zj )}]. More generally, anti-symmetry can be 
shown from the consideration of "ordered states". Calling o'z a 
"permuted state" of z, we call an "ordered state" of z, z, a permuted 
state of z such that z.< zi+1 for all i=l,...n-l. Then the relations 




























































































corresponding ordered states*19 *. If z€Z where Z is a possibility set, 
we say that z is "fundamentally efficient" if z(EZ and no z ’ €Z is such 
that z'sfd z.This "fundamental efficiency" criterion is a necessary 
consequence of Pareto-efficiency and "independent impartiality". The 
set of the fundamentally efficient states is a subset of the set of the 
Pareto-efficient ones, and a priori a much -‘smaller subset when n is 
larger (and Z less "symmetrical" with respect to permutations of the 
z t ). This restriction is the contribution of the "independent 
impartiality" property to the definition of the best choice.
Finally, fundamental preferences (or their equivalent seen by 
an observer) enable one to make inter-individual comparisons of levels 
of satisfaction, happiness, utility, etc., but a priori they do not 
allow one to make inter-individual comparisons of variations in 
utilities, or of intensities of preferences, as long as it remains a 
purely ordinal concept. This a priori makes fundamental preferences by 
themselves unable to judge distributional differences between states, 
and it thus impairs their possible contribution to the definition of 
the optimum. However, fundamental preferences or their equivalent 
partially allow inter-individual comparisons of variations in
utilities, or in intensities of preferences, and this permits the 
restriction of the set of possible optima in a way which turns out to 
be that of fundamental dominance , that is, in particular, which
restricts efficiency to fundamental efficiency.
Indeed, if we call ordinally invariant a relation which remains
the same when u is replaced by any increasing function of itself,
calling Ck various specifications of the z^ , the relation
u(C1)~u(C2) = u(C3)-u(C4) is ordinally invariant if and only if C3
and C2~ C4 , and the relation u(CM-u(C2) > u(C3)-u(CM is ordinally
invariant if and only if C*> C3 and C4 > C2 without indifference in both
relations. Therefore, and for the more general case of a fundamental
ordering, given two states for two individuals 1 and 2, z=(z ,z ) and1 2
z’=(z’,z^), it is ordinally meaningful to say that 1 prefers z’ to z 
more than 2 does if zj > ẑ  > z > zjwith at least one of the two >
r v  t \ i  nu
being the strict >. And it is ordinally meaningful to say that 1 




























































































at least one of the two > being the strict >; we notice that this case 
plus the one obtained by permuting the two individuals are z'sfdz and 
not z'> z. In the same way, it is ordinally meaningful to say that 1
prefers z' to z as much as 2 prefers z to z ’ if zj~ z? > z^~ z^ ; we 
notice that this case plus the one obtained by permuting the two 
individuals are z* fez and not z’~ z. When the individuals both prefer 
the same state, to choose it results from unanimous preference. When 
each prefers a different state, to choose the one which is more 
preferred to the other than the latter is preferred to it when this 
expression is meaningful as explained above, is to comply with 
fundamental dominance — of which unanimous preference is a subcase. 
Fundamental dominance, in general situations, is the extension of this 
inter-individual comparison of variations in ordinal preference levels 
to any number of individuals(2 0 ) .
Ill - APPLICATIONS.
11 - Applications to bi-lateral matchings and in particular to the 
economic theory of marriage.
The foregoing analyses and results have important applications 
in the problems of bi-lateral matchings with a fundamentally consistent 
set of preferences. Section 3-E presented justifications and examples 
of this situation (assignment of employees to firms in the labor 
market, market for sites, houses or cars, etc.). For the sake of 
concreteness, we consider here the case of marriage.
a) Happy and stable marriages.
Monogamous marriage is an important assignment problem of 
indivisible lots. But in this case, the lots — whether the wives or the 
husbands-- also have preferences of their own. In our western, romantic 
view of love, one likes to think that the woman each man marries is the 
woman he prefers, that she is his first best choice, and similarly for 
women choosing men. But if one matching satisfies this condition for 
men's preferences, and another one for women's preferences, what is to 
be done ? What if Jules prefers Jane to Jill, Jim prefers Jill to Jane, 
but Jane prefers Jim to Jules, and Jill prefers Jules to Jim? As 




























































































therefore that marriages can be so ordered, and that any individual 
prefers to make a happier marriage. Then the above theorem asserts that 
such a dilemma cannot arise whatever the number of individuals and 
couples (this number being finite). Women have their wav when men do 
and they can as well let them choose, and conversely. Men's 
non-jealousy and women's non-jealousy, if each can be achieved by some 
matching , necessarily coincide.(At least the preference for one's mate 
is the expressed preference, and this result shows how these 
preferences can be consistent). The above results also show that if the 
quality of a marriage can be measured by an income of the couple 
(including the "psychic income" components) along G. Becker's lines (in 
Schulte,1974), then these "bi-equitable", jealousy-free, matchings 
maximize the sum of these incomes. Finally, this arrangement is 
obviously stable, if we say that a matching is stable if there does not 
exist a pair of a man and a woman belonging to different couples who 
both prefer to marry each other instead (stable sortings are the 
equilibria of the "marriage market", they constitute the core of the 
"marriage matching game", they result from freedom of matching).
The results of the previous sections also show that these 
properties equally hold if we restrict the set of the marriage 
arrangements which we consider to a subset of the n! sortings. In 
particular, they hold if we restrict our consideration to the set of 
stable sortings.
This coincidence of preferences of the sexes seems to oppose 
the result of strict opposition of the interests of the sexes obtained 
by the classical economic theory of marriage. Indeed, this theory, 
where each individual has a strict preference ordering of the 
individuals of the opposite sex, finds that : a stable matching exists, 
there exists one stable matching in which each man marries the woman he 
prefers among all the women which he could marry in stable matchings, 
there exists one stable matching with the symmetrical property for 
women (Gale and Shapley,1962), the mentioned stable matching which is 
the best one for all men is the worst stable matching for all women, 
and symmetrically for the women-preferred stable matching which is the 
worst one for all men (Knuth,1976). That is, with freedom of marriage 




























































































best possible wife for him, which is possible, then each woman is 
afflicted with her worst possible husband, and conversely in inverting 
the sexes'roles.
The only way in which these classical results and ours can be 
reconciled is that there exists only one stable matching, since it is 
then at once the best one and the worst one for each individual.
What has been added to the classical theory, which leads to 
this uniqueness, is the "fundamental consistency" of individual 
orderings.lt is implied by the expression a "more or less happy 
marriage", and it will receive more justification below by considering 
the "joint consumption" and "monotone sharing" aspects of marriage. It 
consists in considering that marriages can be ordered, with any 
individual's preference coinciding with this ordering for the marriages 
he is a part of. This "consistency" imposes some coincidence of 
interest between opposite sexes which results in this uniqueness.
This unique stable sorting is easily characterized. It can be 
constructed by pairing the man and the woman whose marriage is the best 
of all, then the man and the woman whose marriage is the best of all 
possible with the n-1 remaining men and the n-1 remaining women, and so 
on(21). Indeed, let us make the indices coincide for the pairs so 
constituted, and let us classify these pairs in the order of their 
constitution, that is in decreasing*22} order of marriage quality. 
Write > the fundamental relation ordering marriages ij of man i and 
woman j. By construction, we have ii>jk if j>i and k>i without j=k=i. 
This matching is stable since in any other marriage the spouse with the 
lowest index is worse off than he/she was in this matching (consider 
another marriage ij with i^j; if i>j, jj>ij and woman j prefers her 
initial marriage; if i<j, ii>ij and man i prefers his initial 
marriage). Furthermore, this matching is the only stable one.Indeed, 
the first of the marriages of the considered matching that another 
matching breaks, when these marriages are considered in increasing 
order (i.e., decreasing quality), is considered better by the two 
spouses than their lot in this other matching (if cr(i) is man i 's wife 
in this other matching , call j the index such that cr(i)=i for i<j and 




























































































Let us say that a matching is Pareto-efficient, or 
male-Pareto-efficient, or female-Pareto-efficient, when no other 
matching is preferred by all individuals, or by all men, or by all 
women, respectively. Then this stable outcome is Pareto-efficient, 
male-Pareto-efficient and female-Pareto-efficient, since in any other 
matching the man and the woman of the first couple which is broken when 
couples are considered in increasing order (decreasing quality of 
marriage) both become worse off.
If equity is possible for men, or for women, the equitable 
matching (which is unique because of the strict preferences hypothesis 
in this section) is obviously stable. Then the uniqueness of the stable 
matching implies that if equity is possible for men on the one hand, 
and for women on the other hand, the same matching is bi-equitable 
(this constitutes another possible proof of this property).
2 - Marriage and income.
A second trend of the classical economic theory of marriage 
follows Becker's pioneering and bold study mentioned above in assuming 
a household's overall income (including the "psychic" elements) which 
is shared between the spouses. Becker then showed that stable matchings 
maximize total social income, as in other matching problems with a 
similar structure.This, however, implies that a couple's income can be 
freely divided between the spouses.Indeed, call vj = mj+wj the income of 
the marriage of man i with woman j, where mj goes to the husband and wj 
goes to the wife. Consider the situation where man i marries woman i 
for all i 's and where they receive mj and wj . By definition, this 
situation is stable when there does not exist i,j,mj ,wj such that mj>mj 
and wj >wj * There exists such a quadruplet if there exists a pair i,j 
such that vj > mj + wj since, then, the possibility to share arbitrarily 
vj between mj and wj implies that there exists two such numbers such 
that mj >mj and wj >wj • Thus stability implies vj < mj +wj for all i,j 
(indeed, it is equivalent to this condition since an unstable pair i,j 
violates it). Then, if j=cr(i) defines another matching , replacing in 




























































































S v1 < Zm1 + Zw ^ 1 J = ZvJ .
Although compromise and competition do figure among the features 
of marriage formation, such sharing of a household's overall income, 
with full flexibility and induced by competition, may not capture the 
most important characteristics of this complex process. Joint
consumption, love, fairness, duty, social norms, etc., produce other 
structures and results. In particular, even if we keep the notion of a 
household's overall income (including psychic elements), two other 
simple models stand a good chance of being more adequate than the 
former one — although in reality all the mentioned phenomena co-exist. 
One the public good or joint consumption model in which vj = mj = f* .
Probably more items, or aspects, of a household’s production are 
jointly consumed by the spouses than shared in rivalry between them 
(children, many items of the household's house and equipment, status, 
etc.). Even what seems to be one spouse's individual consumption is 
enjoyed by the loving mate. And it is even inherent in love that one 
enjoys the other's enjoyment (indeed, the expression that parents 
"consume” children — common in studies in the economics of the family—  
leads one to say that the spouses similarly "consume" each other). The 
second formulation consists in saying that the household's income is 
shared between the spouses according to some criterion determined by 
sentiments of love or reciprocity or fairness, by sense of duty, or by 
behavior following social norms or customs (or laws),with monotone 
sharing in the sense that an individual's income is higher in a couple 
which produces more. In both models, each spouse prefers a higher vj .
In these cases, man i and woman j do not prefer their voluntary 
marriage to what they obtain in the sorting of k with k for all n k if 
and only if vj < vj or vj < vj , that is,
vj < max (vj , vj ) .
The matching of k with k for all n k is stable if and only if this
relation holds for all i,j. This is the solution described above for an
ordinal structure — if we classify the i 's in decreasing order of the
vj— , which was shown to exist and to be unique. But now this stable
solution does not maximize total income. There may exist cr(i) such that4 3
Zv1 >Zv* . Consider for example the following matrix of the v1 :<?( i ) 1 J 3 i




























































































stable since v* = v* < vj . Yet it yields a global income of 4+1=5 while 
the reverse sorting yields the global income of 3+3=6 (but this 
alternative sorting would not be stable since man 1 and woman 1 prefer 
marrying each other(23)). This inefficiency of free exchange and of 
market equilibrium may provide a rationale for imposing marriages, or 
for limiting free choice of mates, along with income or material 
transfers, which is a common feature of "traditional" societies.
However, adequate or equitable matchings defined by either
vj> v* for all i,j, or vj> vj for all i,j, satisfy the above stability
condition and are equilibria or core solutions, and they maximize
global income produced by the matching, Z v1 .Matchings of each of« <*( 1 )
these two categories are "equitable" for one sex, and adequate for the 
other with the individual incomes (the v* or the "monotone" shares) as 
criteria. The above theorem says that if it is possible to avoid men's
jealousy, and if it is possible to avoid women's jealousy, then
non-jealousy of one sex implies that of the other; but it may be that 
only one sex's jealousy can be avoided, or that jealousy is 
unavoidable.
All these properties remain valid if we restrict the set of 
marriages considered. This restriction is introduced in the definitions 
of the best marriage in various sets, of jealousy and non-jealousy, of 
equity and adequacy, and of the maximal income.This validity is easily 
verified in considering each reasoning (and from the general previous 
results applied here). Such restrictions are particularly significant 
for marriage theory since societies are characterized by restrictions 
they impose on marriages (incest prohibitions, no inter-caste, 
inter-class or inter-cultural or national marriage, endogamy or 
exogamy, age-class restrictions, etc.).
Proposition : With a fundamentally consistent set of individual 
preferences (due for example to joint consumption within pairs or to 
monotone sharing), there is one and only one free exchange stable 
matching. When a pair's income is defined, this equilibrium outcome may 
fail to maximize total income. When equity is possible for either side 
of the market, this outcome has this property and it maximizes total 
income when income is defined. When equity is possible for each sice of 





























































































12 - An application to market equity and to causes of wage rigidities : 
Tinbergen-equitable wages.
a) The problem.
Relations between justice and freedom are among the most 
important questions. In particular, some ideas of what is just, fair or 
equitable may interfere with free choice, free exchange and free 
market, and with the efficiency they entail. Free choices and exchanges 
may violate some fairness criteria, or they may on the contrary 
implement them. When they violate them, this is a most common reason 
for limiting these freedoms, usually through some form of collective 
action.For example, ideas about fair wages, just prices or equitable 
pay often result in non market-clearing wages or prices, which can in 
particular cause "involuntary unemployment". The importance of 
considerations of this type in the process of wage determination seems 
obvious. It is shown in hundreds of studies in the fields of labor or 
industrial relations (which specializes in this topic), sociological 
investigations and psychological experiments12 4 ) . A number of 
economists have also mentioned it, and, more recently, the economic 
literature has shown consequences of related attitudes on decreases in 
the variability of prices (Kahneman, Knatsch and Thaler, 1986a and b), 
on the narrowing of wage differentials (Frank, 1984,1985), on 
unemployment (Akerlof, 1982,1988, Kolm, 1986,1988a and b) and for 
fiscal policy (Kolm, same references).
In particular, a most common sentiment about fair remunerations 
is that a wage is justifiably higher than another one if it compensates 
a labor which is more painful, dangerous, tiring, tiresome, boring, 
dirty, lacking in status or glamour, or more disagreeable in any other 
way, or which requires more time, effort or money for training or 
education. But what wage differentials would this opinion justify, 
given that different individuals may have different preferences on all 
these aspects and on income? An answer which compares the wage levels 
pair-wise,which is based only on individual preferences and respects 




























































































and which does not require any inter-individual comparison of
preferences, necessarily has the following form: "I prefer my wage with 
my occupation to having your wage and your occupation", you have the 
symmetrical preference, and this holds for any pair of individuals in 
the set under consideration. This was the answer provided by Ehrenfest 
to a query from Jan Tinbergen in the early forties 
(Tinbergen,1953,Pen,1971). This criterion is "equity" as defined above 
applied to lots which are pairs of an occupation and of the
corresponding wage. This will be called Tinberqen-equitv.
We consider a set of n individual "workers", each of which has 
a labcftr occupation or job (of any type) and a wage wt . i,j,k=l,...n are 
indices. A set of one for each individual i, {wi } , is called a wage
profile. Differences w^-w. are the n2 wage differentials. An assignment
of individuals to occupations (or of occupations to individuals) is an 
occupation profile. And a wage-occupation (wage-job) profile is a wage 
profile and an occupation profile. Each individual i has an ordinal 
preference (utility) function depending on pairs of a wage level w and 
an occupation j, ut (w,j). The functions ut (w,j), as functions of w, are 
monotone, increasing, and such that for each quadruplet (i,j,k,w) there 
exists w' such that u i (w',j)£u (w,k). Eventually, these functions have 
a specification of the additive linear form in w, u1 (w,j)= w-c* , where 
c* is the "cost" to individual i of holding occupation j. This cost 
takes into account all effects of work except the wage compensation 
received, including any "psychic" and "intangible" effects, any 
positive and desired effects of occupation (which decrease the cost), 
and eventually various possible costs of formation.
When we consider the properties of a wage-job profile, we make 
the three indices coincide, that is, individual i holds job i and 
receives wage ŵ  .
Tinbergen-equity is
ut (w a ,i)>ut (Wj ,j) for all i,j.
With linear additive utilities, it is
w -c1> w -c1 for all i,j, i i j j J
which consists in upper and lower bounds on wage differentials




























































































The following questions are relevant. Are Tinbergen-equitable 
wages (wage profiles) possible for a given occupation profile? Are 
Tinbergen-equitable wage-occupation profiles possible? What is the 
relation between Tinbergen-equity and the outcome of a free-exchange, 
competitive market (does the market violate Tinbergen-equity, or does 
it implement it, does Tinbergen-equity require interfering with the 
market and forbidding some voluntary exchanges)?
b)  P o s s i b i l i t y  o f  T i n b e r g e n - e q u i t y .
P r o p o s i t i o n : Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles exist.
This is an application of results from Kaneko (1982,1983), 
Quinzii (1984) and Gale (1984). The proof is not short (because of the 
combinatorial structure) and we thus will not adapt it here. Notice 
that these authors call this result the existence of a "competitive 
equilibrium" because given the prices (wages) of each assignment (job) 
no worker prefers another's job to his own (with the corresponding 
wages). But this in general differs from the free exchange market 
equilibrium considered below (and by other authors) in which no firm 
wants and can attract a worker to replace another one with a new wage. 
If the firm j hiring worker i at wage w wants to maximize Pj (w,i) (for 
instance its profit),the mentioned results even imply that there exists 
a wage-job profile which is both Tinbergen-equitable and such that 
(w a ,i)>Pi (ŵ  ,j) for all i,j. The proof consists in showing that 
Tinbergen-equitable wage profiles exist for any job profile in the 
core, where the core is defined as the impossibility of a closed chain 
of job substitutions and new wages which satisfies more all 
participants (it can be defined only for workers or for workers and 
employers), and in showing that the core is not empty. Finally, this 
construction of Tinbergen-equitable wages shows that the same arbitrary 
constant can be added to all wages without their losing this property. 
There thus exists Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles with positive 
(or non-negative) wages.




























































































P r o p o s i t i o n . With additive linear utilities, Tinbergen-equitable 
wage-job profiles minimize total cost; Tinbergen-equitable wages exist 
if and only if the occupation profile minimizes total cost (hence 
Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles exist).
Cost minimization is defined by' Zcj < Zĉ _( i ) for all
permutations o’. This defines a cost-minimizing occupation profile. 
Tinbergen-equity implies wt -cj > w<r{ t ) ~ c .̂( 1 ) for all i ' s and all 
permutations cr. By summing for all i for any given o it implies 
Zcj< Zc^( a) , the cost-minimization condition. Furthermore, adding the 
Tinbergen-equity conditions wj- wt < cj - cj for all closed chains of 
pairs of indices i,j, shows that these conditions are consistent if and 
only if Zcj < 2ĉ .( 4 ) for all permutations cr (some of these permutations 
leave unchanged some indices, some only permute two indices). Thus 
Tinbergen-equitable wages exist if and only if the occupation profile 
minimizes total cost. This proves, with this structure of utilities, 
that Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles exist, and, since the
conditions bear only on wage differentials, that such profiles exist 
with positive (or non-negative) wages.
We naturally say that an occupation profile is cost-equitable
when c* < c* for all i,j, and that it is cost-adequate when cj< cj for
all i,j. Cost-equitable or cost-adequate occupation profiles minimize 
total cost over all occupation profiles. And, by a straightforward 
adaptation of the results of sections 7, 8 and 9, if there exists one 
cost-equitable, or one cost-adequate, occupation profile, then all 
cost-minimizing occupation profiles have this property. Therefore,
Proposition. If cost-equitable, or cost-adequate, occupation profiles 
exist, then Tinbergen-equity implies this property.
d) Fully defined jobs.
We define a job i by describing with all the required precision 
and specification all the actions of all types it entails, so that its 
product in money value can be written as pt , without having to mention 
who performs these actions. This product is measured net of non-wage 
costs to the employer and is assumed not to depend on the other 




























































































of the individuals will be considered explicitly in the next 
sub-sections. We note here that it depends essentially on the specific 
problem under consideration. In particular it depends on the set of 
individuals- and of jobs considered, and on the analytical treatment of 
many characteristics, such as education and training, or location, 
which could be considered either as given or as variables with costs 
counted within the utility costs c* or paid by the employer who is left 
with pi . The employer supplying job i at the wage w earns the profit 
p^-w. We then have the following results.
Proposition. A wage profile is Tinbergen-equitable if and only if the 
wage-job profile is a free-exchange market equilibrium.
By definition, the labor market where individual i holds job i 
for wage wt , for all i, is in free-exchange equilibrium if there does 
not exist a pair of a worker i and a job j?d, and a wage level w, such 
that both this worker and the profit-seeking employer who supplies job 
j prefer that worker i takes on job j at wage w. That is, for no 
triplet (i,j,w) do we have both u i (w,j)>u. (wt ,i) and pj-w>Pj-w^ (that
is, W<WJ ).
If such a triplet (i,j,w) exists, it implies û  (ŵ  ,j)>ui (w a ,i) 
since u is increasing in w, and the initial situation thus is not 
Tinbergen-equitable. And if the situation is not Tinbergen-equitable, 
there exists at least one pair of different (i,j) such that 
ui ŵj »j)>Ui (Wi Then, there exists one w<w^ such that
ut (w,j)>u. ,i) since ul is continuous in w, and the situation is not
a free-exchange equilibrium of the labor market. Hence the above 
proposition.
With additive linear utilities, Pj-c] is the "surplus”
generated by worker i performing job j. Surplus-maximizing job profiles
are the assignments which satisfy Z(p -cJ)>2(p -c1 ) for all
1 i <>■( 1 > <*■( i )
permutations g. But this condition is equivalent to Zcj<Zc^( i ) . Thus, 
from a previous result, Tinbergen-equitable wage-occupation profiles 
maximize total surplus, and Tinbergen-equitable wages exist if and only 
if the occupation profile maximizes total surplus.




























































































surplus-equitable when pi-cj>pj-cj for all i,j, and surplus-adequate 
when p^-cj>P4-cj for all i,j (equivalent to cost-adequation). A 
wage-occupation profile having any of these two properties maximizes 
total surplus. It can thus support Tinbergen-equitable wages. And, from 
previous results, if one occupation profile is surplus-equitable or 
surplus-adequate, all surplus-maximizing occupation profiles have this 
property, and all Tinbergen-equitable wage-occupation profiles have 
this property. That is, if surplus-equity, or surplus-adequacy, is 
possible, Tinberqen-equity implies this property.
e)  R e a l i s t i c  T i n b e r g e n - e q u i t y .
m
The foregoing properties are considered for a given set of 
individuals and of occupations (for example, it could be in the same 
social or professional category, or type of job and labor, or industry, 
or firm, or location, or it could be nation-wide, etc.). In some 
relevant problems, it may well be that not all individual can perform 
all jobs (not every individual can be Tinbergen, Ehrenfest, Nozick's 
Wilt Chamberlain or Mrs Callas). This leads to two possible alternative 
developments. One consists in restricting the definition of 
Tinbergen-equity by applying its criterion only to possible pairings of 
one individual and one job. This leads to the concept of realistic 
Tinbergen-equity: a wage-occupation profile is defined as being
realistically Tinberqen-equitable when, for each i, individual i can 
hold job i and û  (ŵ  ,i)>ui(ŵ  ,j) if individual i can hold job j. 
Tinbergen-equity implies realistic Tinbergen-equity. Thus the existence 
of realistic Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles is implied by that 
of Tinbergen-equitable ones. And in a free-exchange labor market, only 
possible worker-occupation pairs can exist. Then, we obtain the 
following results by a straightforward qualification and replication of 
the definitions and proofs given above, by restricting the occupation 
profiles considered to the ones which do not contain an impossible 
worker-occupation pair (but we assume that at least one job profile is 
possible). Cost equity, surplus equity and cost and surplus adequacy 
imply the corresponding "realistic" properties.
Propositions. Realistic Tinbergen-equitable wage-job profiles exist.




























































































the wage-job profile is a free-exchange market equilibrium. 
With linear additive utilities,
a realistic Tinbergen-equitable-wage-job profile minimizes total 
cost and maximizes total surplus over all possible occupation profiles.
if realistic cost equitable, or realistic profit equitable, or
realistic cost and _profit adequate. occupation profiles ■can exist, then
all realistic Tinbergen-equitable profiles have the corresponding
property.
f )  F u l l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .
• However, the ethical sentiment*25} may require full 
Tinbergen-equity rather than realistic Tinbergen-equity. Indeed, the 
deep reason for Tinbergen-equity is to limit the effects on pay 
discrepancies of causes other than work disutility for the worker 
(including training in an intertempotal view) — a recurrent theme in 
the social thought of Tinbergen and of others. And one of these causes 
is capacities, more specifically society's demand for capacities. We 
should note, though, that an individual's preference concerning a work 
which he does not have the capacity to perform (thus which can never be 
an effective alternative of his choices) is a concept which may raise 
problems. With full Tinbergen-equity and effective limitations on the 
individuals'capacities to perform the jobs, the above results do not 
necessarily hold any more.
Consider however the situation with a more convenient 
formulation in which individual i holding job j produces p* (net of any 
cost to the employer other than the individual's wage and independent 
from wages and from other occupations), pj=0 is a possibility*26> . The 
general result of the existence of Tinbergen-equitable wage-job 
profiles still holds. Productivity-adequacy is naturally defined by 
p* >p;j f or all i,j, i.e., each job is attributed to the individual who is 
the most productive at it (or to one of these individuals).
Proposition. A wage-job profile is a free-exchange market equilibrium 
if and only if
Ui ( P ]  “ P j +Wj , j ) - U! ( Wt , i )  f o r  a 1 1  ( 1 )




























































































equilibrium there exists a triplet i,j,w, with i^j, such that 
(w,j)>u4 (wt , i) and pj-w>pj-Wj f which implies that there exists i,j 
(i ) such that
ui (pj "Pj +wj ' 3) >ut (w4 , i) . (2)
Thus (1) implies free-exchange equilibrium. And if condition (1) does 
not hold, relation (2) holds for a pair i,j (i^j). Then by
continuity of there exists a w<pj-pj+w^ satisfying ut (w,j)>ui (wi,i). 
But the first inequality is pj-w>pj-w^ . Hence the situation is not a 
free exchange equilibrium. Thus free exchange equilibrium implies (1).
Condition (1) provides the relation between Tinbergen-equity 
and free exchange equilibrium. If pj<pj for all i,j, Tinbergen-equity 
implies free exchange equilibrium. And if pj >pj for all i,j, free 
exchange equilibrium implies Tinbergen-equity.
Proposition. Tinbergen-equity and productivity adequacy imply free 
exchange equilibrium.
The condition under which free exchange equilibrium implies
Tinbergen-equity is more bizarre, since it says that the holder of each
job is the least efficient performer of that job. Thus labor market
equilibrium may violate Tinbergen-equity. However, with linear additive
utilities it still maximizes total surplus, and it is such that a
surplus-maximizing occupation profiles can support free exchange
equilibrium wages. Indeed, condition (1) becomes
p1 -pJ +w -c1 < w -c1 J J i i
or
Wj - w 4 < pj  - c j  - ( p j  - c j  ) f o r  a l l  i , j .
For any permutation o', writing j=<x(i) and summing these inequalities 
for all i gives
or
0<Zp i > . *( 1 > Zc1 - Z(p11 ^  <Tt
i - ni '1
this condition for all cr 's guarantees the consistency of
Ztp1 c1)>Z(p1 - c1 ) .
i i i  ) i >
Conversely
the free exchange conditions on wage differentials. And since- wages 
enter the conditions only through these differentials, one can add a 
same arbitrary constant to all of them, and they can always be positive 




























































































g)  Wage f l o o r s .
When free market wages are not Tinbergen-equitable, a desire 
for this property may lead to imposing the corresponding limitations on 
wage differentials. Limitations of the spread of wages for reasons of 
equity, or for limiting social strife or malaise that feelings of 
inequity may spurn, is most common within firms or organizations, or 
through collective bargaining, or sometimes as national policies, and 
the idea to admit only differences justifiable by the disutility of the 
various jobs (perhaps including the various costs of training) is among 
the common notions. Market disequilibria generally result, and in 
particular involuntary unemployment (we may recall that Keynes views 
notions and behaviors of workers concerning wage differentials or 
ratios as the main cause of wage rigidities128}). Tinbergen-equity 
submits each wage w a to the wage floor wt >wt where wt is defined by
u i (wt ,i)= max ut (wj ,j). Let us say that two jobs i and j are equivalent
j
for workers when u (w,i)=u (w,j), for all workers k and all wage levelsk k
w. For these two jobs, Tinbergen-equity implies
ut (wt ,i)>ut (Wj ,j)=ut (w ,i), and thus >wj , and by permuting i and j, 
ŵ  >wi , and therefore wt =Wj . Consider for example a situation with two
categories of jobs, all jobs in one category being equivalent for
workers. The "higher" jobs are performed by individuals i€H with wi=wh . 
the "lower" jobs are performed by individuals i€L with wt=w^. We assume 
wh >w^. Then' Tinbergen-equity restricts the wage differential by 
T < wh-w^< 7*2 . For example, with linear additive utilities and calling
c1 =cj for j€H and c \ = c l,  for j€L, r = max (c^-c1») and r = min (cj-c1,).
i€H i€LThen, if w^ is given (for example by market equilibrium for lower jobs, 
or by a horizontal labor supply curve at a minimum wage level 
— subsistence or other— , or by a minimum wage law), this equity 
requires a wage floor on the higher wages, w^w^+T^.Or if wfa is 
determined in any way, this equity submits the lower wages to the wage 
floor w >w -T . The differences in utility due to these two categories
of jobs may in particular result from the "higher" labor requiring more
effort, or more training or education, than the "lower" one. Of course, 
other fairness criteria limiting wage discrepancies can have similar 




























































































h) Full-payment occupational equity.
Indeed, Tinbergen-equity is in a sense somewhat extreme 
(although it describes an opinion which is widespread in some cultures 
and circles). For instance, the frequent correlation between pay and 
interest of the job tends to violate it (less so, however, if we take 
into account the various costs of education, when the better paid and 
more interesting jobs are those which require more education). The 
relative extremism of this criterion consists in limiting the 
explicitly legitimate effect of productivity on the wage to the 
workers'disutility accompanying this productivity (for instance painful 
effort̂ , tiring attention, training and education, etc.). Pure talent, 
or pure correspondence of individual characteristics to the market 
demand, is not explicitly taken into account (although capacity to 
produce the painful effort is considered — which shows that this 
question is not as simple as it may seem). From the famous slogan "to 
each one according to his work", it retains "to each one according to 
the disutility of his work" and it disregards "to each one according to 
the utility of his work to others". On the contrary, both the 
disutility of work, and the legitimacy of receiving one's productivity 
benefits are taken into account in the full-payment occupational 
equity. This criterion is defined when the workers are paid their 
product, so that individual i in job j receives the wage p* and pure 
profits are zero. That can for instance result from competition between 
employers (it could also be an application of the old classical ethical 
principle of "full payment of the product of labor"). This equity 
criterion then is
ut (pj , i ) > u i (p* , j) for all i, j
(while Tinbergen-equity with full product wages would be
U1 (pj ,i)>ut (pj , j) for all i , j) .
Then, by definition, each worker does not prefer any other's 
occupation, and each employer's profit is zero whoever his employee may 
be. Thus full payment occupational equity implies free exchange 
equilibrium. Furthermore, it maximizes total surplus with linear 
additive utilities. Yet, full payment occupational equity may not be 
possible. However, if the job supply is perfectly elastic in the sense 
that there is an unlimited supply of jobs of each kind (i.e., jobs 




























































































an individual can choose any kind of job whatever the others do, he 
does not prefer any other individual's job, and free choice of 
occupation implements full payment occupational equity (this is an 
example of the equity property of "equality of opportunity").
10 -  C o n c l u s i o n .
The general analysis and the examples proposed above seem to 
suggest that the structural properties of equity, adequacy and 
fundamental dominance have a wide scope of relevance, of meaningfulness 
and gf applicability. This is a fortiori the case for the set of these 
three properties, the interest of which is notably enhanced by the 
association of two facts: on the one hand, their logical relations of 
implication, complementarity or extension (the above results), and on 
the other hand the often wide differences in their meanings (in 
particular for application to the ethic of distribution) and in their 
scope of applicability and of existence. Other meaningful properties 
belonging to the same families, and relations between them, could be 
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(1) The general and consistent use of criteria by definition rules out
casuistry in social choice.Reflective equilibrium rules out 
intuitionism applied to specific situations, and also to criteria 
as when one is chosen just for the favorable first impression it 
makes on us and is then used as an axiom. The multiplicity of 
criteria interferes with the hope of deriving all judgements from a 
single all-encompassing simple criterion such as maximizing social 
utility or welfare (as in utilitarianism or welfarism) or obeying 
individual freedom (as in Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia or in 
Kolm's Liberal Social Contract), or even from very few criteria 
(two or three for Rawls). A problem is that these general criteria 
cannot be applied without other defining and specifying criteria. 
But the various more specific criteria of rational social choice 
have smaller and different domains of applicability (of 
meaningfulness, relevance and decisiveness). They emphasize
different aspects. Then the relations between the criteria become 
an essential point.
(2) Rawls relates the method of reflective equilibrium between theory 
and intuition to Aristotle (A Theory of Justice, pp.48-51). Indeed, 
his specific "reflective equilibrium" for choosing principles of 
justice is but an application of what Plato calls "dialectics" in 
the Republic (rather than in the Dialogues), which involves 
consciously systematic "upward ascents" of the mind to basic 
principles alternating with "descents to conclusion". Moreoverr, 
our "consistent network of criteria" approach certainly is a part 
of what Plato calls epistasthai ("rational understanding" rather 
than just "knowing"). More specifically, this approach is an 
application of Spinoza's "coherence theory" of "adequate ideas" 
which matter primarily for their logical relation with each other. 
This approach is the correct one here (rather than the competing 
"correspondence" theory of truth as a relation between ideas and 
reality) because of the nature of the topic — the search for 
ethical and justice criteria.
(3) As used by Erhenfest, Tinbergen, Foley, Schmeidler, Yaari, Kolm, 
Varian, Thomson, Baumol and a number of others (see references).




























































































(5) But, we shall see, a society may Pareto-improve its situation by 
forbidding some marriages (thus implementing an unstable set) along 
with the relevant transfers.
(6) Unanimity (and thus Pareto-efficiency) needs also to be justified.
One possible justification is logical: if all the individuals of
society say that A is better than B, then the notion that it is not 
so cannot exist.
(7) Pareto considers both individual "Bergson" social welfare functions 
(individual utilities each function of all individuals'"oph£limi- 
ties") and an ethical social welfare function depending on indivi­
dual utilities.
(8) Notice that this is the very example with which Tinbergen (and 
Ehrenfest) introduced this concept in the early forties under the 
name of "the exchange principle" (see Tinbergen (1953) , Pen (1971) , 
Kolm (1971)).
(9) This is also "first order stochastic dominance" (since if these 
numbers for each state are classified in non-decreasing order the 
property says that one of these two "curves" is nowhere below the 
other one), or Suppes' "grading principle". The reason for the 
adjective "fundamental" will appear below, with the emphasis that 
this is a relation for ordinal, but inter-individually comparable, 
utilities.
(10) Early formulations of this "negative" egalitarian principle can be 
found in Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics), Hobbes (Leviathan), Locke 
(Second Treatise in Government), and, not surprisingly, in a 
particularly clear manner by the co-author of Laplace’s "Principle 
of insufficient reason" for assigning equal probabilities to events 
for which we have no reason to assign different ones: 
Condorcet,1789.
(11) This was introduced in Kolm (1973), and elaborated extensively by 
Thomson (1988) .
(12) This is the "justice" property in Kolm, 1971,part III.
(13) Envy and jealousy are different sentiments. Jealousy usually is 
deeper and affects more the "self". It requires more than the 
jealous individual can effectively have the place of the individual 
he is jealous of — thus jealousy is often better grasped by 
"realistic equity" considered below where the comparison is only 




























































































with competition. The remarks of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1983) 
would also be both pertinent and debatable (Kolm,1987).
(14) Detailed analysis of such a market is beyond our present topic 
(see for example Shapley and Shubik (1972), Demange, Gale and 
Sotomayor (1986)). One relevant result is that it is possible to 
induce individuals to reveal their true v*J in a sealed bid by 
specifying appropriately the price each will have to pay as a 
function of the figures announced (see G. Demange (1982), Leonard 
(1983), G. Demange and D. Gale (1985)).
(15) Apart from the use of fundamental preferences in cases where it is 
unproblematic or as an undiscussed structure in specific questions, 
a few economists or other scholars have hinted at, or discussed, or 
adopted general fundamental preferences for general purposes. These 
works differ according to the development or existence of a 
justifying discussion, to the fact that they consider a cardinal 
utility or an ordinal one (or an ordering), and to their use of 
this concept which can be positive (explanation of tastes) or 
normative-ethical. Harsanyi (1955) uses a fundamental cardinal 
utility, as does Suppes (1966). Tinbergen (1957) discusses the idea 
that people may be on the "same" indifference locus when some 
parameter which differs from one to the other is considered as a 
variable. Kolm (1966,1971) discusses and uses fundamental 
preference orderings and fundamental ordinal utilities. Rawls 
(1971)'s hypothetical individuals "in the original position", 
"behind the veil of ignorance", who are identical and doubtlessly 
rational (endowed with preference orderings), imply the existence 
of fundamental preferences, and this author discusses this question 
more explicitly in Sen and Williams (1982).Hammond (1976)and Arrow 
(1977) also use explicit ordinal fundamental utilities, the latter 
with relevant reference to his previous discussions (1963) and with 
the labelling "co-ordinal" and "co-cardinal" preferences or 
utilities. Fundamental preferences are also 3ecker (1976)'s "stable 
preferences", and they are implicit but, I think, clear, and 
probably necessary, in Stigler and Becker (1977)'s advocacy of 
explaining explicitly the differences in tastes among individuals. 
Roemer (1986) also considers and uses ordinal utility or ordering. 
All these works except the discussions by Becker and by Stigler and 




























































































purpose. It should be noticed that any proposed solution of the 
general ethical problem of the "good" distribution in society 
requires bold concepts of one kind or another (and a fundamental 
preference ordering is definitely less bold than most). An analysis 
of the mathematical problems which the hypothesis of fundamental 
preferences raises in the cardinal case is provided in Howe (1985).
(16) Permutations pairing xj with y i are for instance impossible if xj
includes the description of a task that individual i does not have
the capacity to perform for any reason, or if Xj includes such a
description plus an associated wage while individual i 's
performance in this job cannot obtain this remuneration from the
market. Or the possibility of effectively pairing x with y may • j 1
for instance require that individual i and some item in lot Xj be 
in the same location or exist at the same dates, and if that is not 
the case assignments including this pairing may be considered 
impossible. But, also, the possibility that individual i obtains a 
wage indicated within the description may depend upon the other 
pairings in the assignment — for instance other individuals can be 
assigned jobs which are complementary to i 's and heighten i 's 
productivity, or on the contrary which compete with i ’ s output and 
limit his gain from it, or they can, as a result of the assignment, 
receive incomes which they will choose to spend on i 's products.
(17) It is convenient here to define fundamental dominance as this 
"weak" fundamental dominance which includes z ^ z' (and such that 
zfdz) .
(18) For instance, one can take W=Zu (z a ) and w°= 2u^( i , » or W = n u(zt ) 
and w <r= n u1«■( i )
(19) Fundamental preference enables one to consider "maximin" and 
"leximin" criteria and orderings, and, obviously, zsfdz' implies 
leximin preference of z over z'. For given sets of individuals and 
lots, if one and only one assignment in R is R-equitable, R 
-adequate or R-fundamentally dominant, leximin classifies it above 
all other assignments in R (if several assignments in R have this 
property, any of them is "leximin-better" than or fundamentally 
equivalent to all other assignments in R).
(20) Fundamental dominance does not exist between two states in 
particular if both the worst and the best of the 2 n individual 




























































































structures for which fundamental dominance does not allow one to
compare the two states z and z ’ are z| < zz< zj< ẑ  and
z’ < z < z < z’ (since the labellings of individuals and of states 1 1 2  2
are irrelevant, and omitting the cases of indifference for 
simplicity). In these cases, however, it should be noticed that all 
the ordinally meaningful egalitarian criteria classify z before z'. 
These criteria are, in order of decreasing ethical defensibility, 
maximin (and leximin) since min u(z^) > min u(z’), minimal
i i
inequality since |u (z^)-u(z’ ) | > |u(z2 )-u(zi ) |, and minimax (and
lexicographic minimax or leximax) since max u(z.) < max u(z’). In
i ithe case of any n, Hammond (1976) and Arrow (1977) deduce leximin 
from a preference of z over z' when, for any two individuals 1 and 
2, z’ < zi < zz < z2 , while z.~ zj for all i?*l, 2 — Pareto-ef f iciency 
precludes leximax—  (see also the introduction of leximin in Kolm 
(1971)).
(21) If, at some stage, there are several best possible marriages in 
the set where the new choice is to be made (those marriages being 
for different men and different women), we choose any of them and 
the following reasonings and results are the same.
(22) Resp. non-increasing.
(23) Notice that the eventual "public good" aspect is confined within 
pairs and thus does not provide an externality in the usual sense 
which would be the cause of this inefficiency.
(24) A number of references are gathered in Kolm,1988a.
(25) This expression is better than the usual one "ethical intuition", 
since the word "intuition" implies the existence of some true fact 
about which this intuition is.
(26) By defining the fact that individual i holds job j in specifying 
with sufficient detail all the corresponding actions, one could 
always have =0 or p - i n d e p e n d e n t  of i , but that is less 
interesting.
(27) For brevity we omit in this paper the discussion of eventual 
constraints on wages such as, in addition to w.>0, non-negative 
profits pj-wt>0 or wt<pj , or ut (wt ,i)>ui (0,0)) where j=0 means that 
the individual i does not work.
(28) General Theory, chap.2.




























































































consequences on employment and for policy consists in considering 
explicitly preferences on wage differentials or on relative wages, 
and in deducing the corresponding behavior and the "optimal
taxation" induced by this non-classical feature (see 
Kolm,1988a,b ,c). The resulting unemployment may not deserve to be 
called "involuntary” (but the wage may be imposed on individuals by 
collective action). Other fairness criteria may arise from the very 
formulation used here. When comparing utilities with permutations 
involving the three variables of wages, occupations and
individuals, Tinbergen-equity is the one which does not require 
inter-individual comparability of utilities and which allows the 
most variation otherwise since both jobs and wages vary (together) 
in the comparisons. If, with linear additive utilities, we use the 
money value for defining "adequacy", the concept dual to 
Tinbergen-equity is -cj >wi -cj for all i,j, or cj <cj for all i,j, 
or "cost-adequacy" (the holder of each job finds it the least 
costly). Thus Tinbergen-equitable wages and cost-adequate 
assignments have the general relations between equity and adequacy 
presented above. The converse "cost-equity" cj<cj for all i,j
implies existence of Tinbergen-equitable wages since with it any
set of equal wages satisfies Tinbergen-equity. But if we compare 
utilities inter-indiviaually, there is no reason not to switch all 
three variables together, that is to adopt the condition
wt-cj >wj-cj for all i,j, or wj “wj =cj -cj for all i,j.
(30) For example "minimal equity" and "minimal adequacy" are
respectively defined by: for each i there exists j?d. such that
x > x , or x ,y >x ,y . Or fundamental preferences enable one to 
iconsider majorities (relative ones for choosing amongst more than 
two states) between variously permuted states. A number of other 
properties intervene when the x. are vectors of quantities of 
commodities. The concept of adequacy, its relations to equity and 
the relation of both to fundamental dominance were presented in 
Kolm (1971), part III, section B and paragraph C.4.g. The 
properties of fundamental dominance and the other related concepts 
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